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Abstract: In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set
theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustı´n
Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic
universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between
the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways.
One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hier-
archy are open-ended, or that neither is. If there is reason to accept the view that
the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most
compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front.
It is now common to interpret ordinary, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (with or
without urelements) as capturing the so-called iterative conception of set. The idea is
that sets, or at least well-founded sets, are arranged in levels, with the levels indexed
by ordinals. We ‘begin’ with a collection R0 of urelements, which we take to be a
set. For each ordinal a , the successor rank Ra+1 is√(Ra)[R0, the powerset of Ra
together with the urelements. If l is a limit ordinal, then
Rl =
[
b<l
Rb .
With so-called ‘pure’ set theory, there are no urelements. So we ‘begin’ with the
empty set V0, and, for each ordinal a , the corresponding rank is dubbed Va .
In the philosophical literature, there has been much discussion of late on the
question of absolute generality, whether there is a definite totality, or plurality, of
absolutely all objects (see, e.g., Rayo and Uzquiano 2006). For present purposes,
the most interesting instance of this question is whether there is a definite totality, or
plurality, of absolutely all sets, or absolutely all well-founded sets.1 On the iterative
conception, that question comes down to whether there is a definite totality, or plu-
rality, of all ordinals, through which one does the above iteration (assuming that the
powerset operation is well-defined, and definite).
Call someone who countenances a definite totality, or plurality, of all sets an
absolutist. There are two kinds. The non-austere absolutist holds that there are (well-
founded) collections of sets that are not themselves sets. These are the so-called
‘proper classes’. One such class, sometimes called V , contains all pure, iterative
sets. Another proper class is W, the class of all ordinals.2 Accordingly,
V =
[
b2W
Vb .
A non-austere absolutism is more or less implicit in the treatment of higher-order set
theory in Shapiro 1991, where proper classes are among the ‘logical sets’.
In contrast, the austere absolutist holds that sets are the only (well-founded) col-
lections that there are. Such a view was championed by George Boolos who re-
sponded to the proposal of proper classes with a quip: ‘Wait a minute! I thought that
set theory was supposed to be a theory about all, “absolutely” all, the collections that
there were and that “set” was synonymous with “collection”.’ (Boolos 1998, p. 35)
A position that opposes both kinds of absolutism is that there just is no defi-
nite totality, or plurality, of absolutely all sets, or absolutely all well-founded ‘pure’
sets. The sets are, in effect, open-ended. Michael Dummett (1993, p. 441) defines
an ‘indefinitely extensible concept’ to be ‘one such that, if we can form a definite
conception of a totality all of whose members fall under the concept, we can, by
reference to that totality, characterize a larger totality all of whose members fall un-
der it’. The set-theoretic relativist holds that the iterative hierarchy is indefinitely
extensible (see Zermelo 1930, Shapiro and Wright 2006).
A recent paper by Øystein Linnebo and Agustı´n Rayo (forthcoming) includes an
interesting argument against absolutism, based on Kurt Go¨del’s remark that
the theory of aggregates, as presented by Zermelo, Fraenkel and von
Neumann ... is nothing else but a natural generalization of the theory
of types, or rather, it is what becomes of the theory of types if certain
superfluous restrictions are removed. (Go¨del 1933, pp. 45–6)
Linnebo and Rayo claim that, in light of the close connection between set theory
and type theory, we should accept that the set-theoretic (ontological) hierarchy is
1As is customary, we do not take ‘plurality’ to refer to an entity, set-like or otherwise. It is merely
a shorthand for a plural construction.
2We take ordinals here to be the order-types of well-orderings. It is an option to identify them with
certain sets, such as the von Neumann ordinals.
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indefinitely extensible given that is it natural to hold that the suitably idealized type-
theoretic (ideological) hierarchy is similarly open-ended.
We dispute that line of argument here. The connection between set theory and a
suitably liberalized type theory does suggest some arguments against absolutism, but
those are analogues of arguments that have been brought against absolutism in set
theory already, arguments that the absolutist has already confronted, or should have
confronted, and somehow resolved, either by biting a bullet or by coming up with
some compelling counter-considerations.
In effect, once type theory has been liberalized, in the way Linnebo and Rayo in-
dicate, the connection between type theory and set theory is extremely tight. The two
become all but notational variants on each other. So any philosophical conclusions
cut both ways. One should either hold that both the set-theoretic hierarchy and the
liberalized ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or that neither is.
In what follows, we briefly recapitulate the main positions and arguments on set-
theoretic absolutism. After that, we sketch the Linnebo-Rayo connection between
set theory and type theory, suitably liberalized. We note that the underlying semantic
principles they invoke are remarkably similar to Cantor’s two number principles,
and give rise to the same problems. This sets the stage for our argument that the
connection between set theory and liberalized type theory provides no new pressure
on set-theoretic absolutism, but perhaps reinforces or, better, recapitulates earlier
arguments on the issue.
1 Traditional arguments against absolutism
The most powerful arguments against absolutism about sets are tied somehow to the
paradoxes of Russell and Burali-Forti. We begin with the former. According to a
natural principle of set formation, any definite totality or plurality forms a set. The
absolutist countenances a definite totality of all sets. So it follows from this natural
principle that there is a set of all sets. But this is inconsistent with a separation
principle. One can, of course, challenge the separation principle (see, e.g., Quine
1937 and Forster 1992), but we do not consider that option here. All parties to
the present debate—austere absolutist, non-austere absolutist, and relativist—accept
that there is no set of all sets. Therefore, both kinds of absolutists must reject the
aforementioned natural principle that any definite totality forms a set. This leaves
themwith the hard challenge of explaining why some definite totalities, or pluralities,
fail to form sets, and of saying something about which ones do and which ones do
not.
The argument can be generalized further against the non-austere absolutist. What-
ever collections he is willing to admit, an analogue of Russell’s paradox would show
that there is no collection of all such collections (assuming a generalization of the
separation principle, anyway). So either he must explain why some definite totalities
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do not even form collections, or else he must agree that there is no definite totality
of all collections. The second option is to give up on the absolutism at the next level.
Such a combination might be consistent, but it looks unmotivated and ad hoc.
There is a semantic version of the Russell argument. There is, of course, no in-
terpretation of the language of set theory whose domain is a set containing all sets
as members (continuing to assume a separation principle). The non-austere abso-
lutist can overcome this by expanding the ontology to include proper classes. But
then the non-austere absolutist cannot produce an interpretation of the language of
class theory whose domain consists of all classes. She might try to overcome this
limitation by expanding the ontology even further, and introduce what we may call
proper super-classes, collections of classes which are not themselves classes. The
procedure here obviously iterates. For the non-austere absolutist, semantic reflection
progressively motivates the introduction of more and more layers of classes. The
introduction of such layers looks suspiciously like expanding the iterative hierarchy
to more levels. And, of course, there is a lingering question concerning the totality,
or plurality, of all such classes.
In the hierarchy of classes, there is a precise sense in which what appear to be
proper classes at each stage in the process can be regarded as sets at the next stage.
This is exactly the picture of the open-ended universe of sets proposed by Ernst
Zermelo (1930). The idea is that any theory that purports to characterize all sets,
or all classes, or whatever, can be reinterpreted as describing only a particular level
in the iterative hierarchy, not the hierarchy itself. This is the position of the set-
theoretic relativist. The absolutist, or at least the austere absolutist, insists that any
such interpretation misrepresents the intended semantic content of set theory, which,
to repeat the quip by Boolos, is ‘supposed to be a theory about all, “absolutely” all,
the collections that there are’. The relativist, however, is content with the limited
semantic picture. He takes the austere absolutist’s insistence to be symptomatic of
her ‘lack of a more comprehensive conception of set’ (Parsons 1974, p. 11), and
he finds the non-austere iteration of layers of classes to just be a description of the
iterative hierarchy (of sets) itself.
A further threat to absolutism comes from the Burali-Forti paradox and, in par-
ticular, from apparent cases of well-orderings that are ‘longer’ than W, the supposed
definite totality of all ordinals.3 If quantification over all ordinals is legitimate, then
it is straightforward to construct formulas that define well-orderings ‘longer’ thanW.
Consider, for example, the relation between pairs (a,b ) of ordinals in lexicographic
order:
(a1,b1)  (a2,b2) if and only if either a1 < a2 or both a1 = a2 and b1 < b2.
3To avoid begging the question against the austere absolutist, we do not have to think of ‘W’ here
as a singular term denoting a proper class. One can take it to be a plural term, such as ‘the ordinals’.
Or one can think of ‘W’ as a predicate, and read a phrase like ‘a is in W’ as ‘a is an ordinal’.
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This characterizes a well-ordering of type W2 (so to speak). The well-ordering type
of this well-ordering, of course, cannot be in W. However, W is supposed to be the
totality of, to paraphrase Boolos, all, absolutely all, the ordinals that there are. And,
it seems, ‘ordinal’ is supposed to be synonymous with ‘well-ordering type’.
Occasionally, set theorists at least seem to carry out transfinite recursions and
inductions on these ‘long’ well-orderings. In the spirit of non-austere absolutism,
it would tempting to accommodate this phenomenon by expanding the ontology to
include what we may call ‘super-ordinals’, well-ordering types longer than W. But
this expansion immediately gives rise to the possibility of defining even more well-
orderings. The upshot is that, if quantification over all ordinals is legitimate, as it
is for the absolutist in defining the iterative hierarchy, then there is pressure in the
direction of indefinite extensibility (see Shapiro 2003, Shapiro and Wright 2006). Of
course, this is not to say that the pressure cannot be resisted.
2 The connection between set theory and type theory
Let us define liberalized type theory to be the result of extending standard type theory
through the transfinite, by indexing the orders with ordinals. This means that there
are, or can be, at least as many typed languages as there are ordinals. For each ordinal
a , there is, or can be, an a th-order language.
More details will be provided below. For now, we are interested in a broad justifi-
cation of this liberalization. Go¨del himself seemed to have had a pragmatic attitude:
we develop a liberalized type theory just because we can. One of the main aims of
Linnebo and Rayo forthcoming, however, is to provide some systematic considera-
tions in favour of a liberalized type theory.
Define a generalized semantics for a given language to be a theory of all possible
interpretations of that language. Suppose, now, that you are open to the possibility of
embracing a typed language of a particular order. Suppose also that you espouse what
we may call Semantic Optimism, namely the view that, if you embrace a language
of a given order, it should be possible to provide a generalized semantics for that
language. Linnebo and Rayo (forthcoming, Appendix, Theorem 2) show that, on the
assumption that it is possible to quantify over absolutely everything, an analogue of
Cantor’s Theorem entails that a generalized semantics for a typed language of order
a cannot be developed in any language of order a . They also show that for any level
a , a generalized semantics for a language of order a can be developed in a language
of order a + 1, or a + 2 if a is a limit ordinal (Linnebo and Rayo forthcoming,
Appendix, Theorem 3).
These two results push the semantic optimist from any legitimate type-theoretic
language to another language immediately above it, i.e., to what we may call its
‘successor language’. By themselves, however, the results do not deliver a genuine
liberalized type theory, as they are compatible with there being only finite orders: a
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generalized semantics for an nth-order language is carried out in a language of order
n+1. What is needed is a principle capable of justifying languages corresponding to
limit orders.
An intuitive idea is that, for any legitimate languages, there is, or can be, a ‘union’
language that encompasses all of them. Call this the principle of Naı¨ve Union. As
noted, a language of each finite order is justified on the basis of Semantic Optimism
(in light of the results reported just above). So Naı¨ve Union justifies a language of
order w . Semantic Optimism would then give us languages of order w + 1, w + 2,
etc. Naı¨ve Union would yield a language of order 2w . A simple transfinite induc-
tion yields the existence of a language at the level of each ordinal. This is a fully
liberalized type theory.
However, as it stands, Naı¨ve Union is self-defeating—it is inconsistent with Se-
mantic Optimism (in light of the foregoing results). We apply Naı¨ve Union to all
of the legitimate languages generated by the transfinite induction, and generate a
‘union’ language that encompasses all of them. But then Semantic Optimism would
yield a language distinct from all of these languages (again in light of the results
from Linnebo and Rayo). In effect, this just is the Burali-Forti paradox—assuming
that the orders of liberalized type languages are to be indexed by ordinals. Linnebo
and Rayo opt for the following restriction of Naı¨ve Union.
Set-theoretic Principle of Union: For l a limit ordinal, if one is prepared
to countenance languages of order b , for every b < l , then one should
also countenance a language of order l .
With the axiom of choice, this amounts to the restriction of Naı¨ve Union to sets of
languages. That is, Set-theoretic Union is the principle that for any set of legiti-
mate languages, a ‘union’ language that encompasses all of them is also legitimate.
This union principle succeeds in delivering the full liberalized hierarchy of languages
without incurring the problem generated by Naı¨ve Union, assuming the background
set theory, of course.
Semantic Optimism and the various principles of Union are remarkably similar to
Georg Cantor’s two generating principles for transfinite numbers. The first licenses
the addition of ‘a unity to an already formed and existing number’ (Cantor 1883,
p. 907), a successor to that number. This is the analogue of Semantic Optimism.
Cantor’s second principle states that
if any definite succession of defined ... [numbers] is put forward of which
no greatest exists, a new number is created ... which is thought of as the
limit of those numbers; that is, it is defined as the next number greater
than all of them. (Cantor 1883, pp. 907-8)
It is easy to see that these two generating principles are inconsistent with the idea
that there is a definite succession of all transfinite numbers. If there were, then, by
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the second principle, there would be a number greater than all numbers. But such
a number would have to be greater than itself (not to mention being greater than its
successor, as generated by the first principle).
Cantor must thus renounce the idea that there is a definite succession of all transfi-
nite numbers and, of course, he did. However, at least at times, he took the transfinite
numbers, and more generally, all mathematical entities, to belong to a changeless,
fully determined universe. So he embraced what we call absolutism.4 The talk of
‘generation’ and ‘creation’ is only a metaphor.
The compelling question, then, is this: what did Cantor mean by ‘definite’ (or, to
be specific, ‘definite succession’)? Or, perhaps better, what should he have meant?
Being part of a changeless, fully determined universe, is, presumably, not sufficient
for definiteness. With a liberal dose of hindsight, we can ‘interpret’ a definite succes-
sion as one whose elements form a set. Under this ‘interpretation’, Cantor’s second
principle states that, for any set of transfinite numbers, without a greatest element,
there is a least number that is greater than all of the numbers in the set. And, of
course, this is true in contemporary set theory, where ‘number’ is either ‘cardinal
number’ or ‘von Neumann ordinal’. The analogy between this number principle and
Linnebo and Rayo’s Set-theoretic Principle of Union should be striking.
As noted above, Cantor took an absolutist stance toward the transfinite numbers,
at least at times. If his two number principles are somehow consistent with his stance,
once they are properly interpreted, then there is reason to suspect that the analogous
principles in the context of type theory will not be able to adjudicate between abso-
lutism and relativism. To be blunt, it would be surprising if Semantic Optimism and
the Set-theoretic Principle of Union could undermine absolutism about sets in a way
that Cantor’s generating principles do not.
Let us now briefly recapitulate some details of Linnebo and Rayo’s liberalized
type theory. This will articulate the sense in which, as Go¨del said, set theory just is
type theory with ‘certain superfluous restrictions removed’. If a is an ordinal, then
let L a be an a th-order language. It contains variables of type b , for every ordinal
b < a . The type of a variable is indicated by a superscript. Type predication is
cumulative, in the sense that an entity of type b can apply to entities of any type
g < b . Moreover, a formula xb (xg), indicating atomic predication, is always well-
formed, even if g   b . As usual, the entities in the type-theoretic hierarchy are
assumed to be extensional. Finally, we assume that for each formula j(xb ), ofL a ,
with xb free,L a contains an abstraction term lxb .j(xb ), of type b +1.
Let L2 be the standard language of set theory, augmented with set-abstraction
terms. If a is an ordinal, letL a2 be the result of augmentingL2 with primitive terms
4If ‘inconsistent multitudes’ count as collections, then Cantor’s absolutism was non-austere. How-
ever, we will not engage this exegetical issue here. See Jane´ 2010 for a lucid account of the idealist
and realist (or perhaps absolutist) elements in Cantor’s thinking.
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Rb , for each b < a . The intended denotation of the term Rb , of course, is the b th
rank in the iterative hierarchy.5 In every L a2 it is required that each quantifier be
bounded by one of the Rb ’s.
For each variable xb in the typed language L a , associate a (unique) variable xb
inL2. There is a natural map ⇤a fromL a toL a2 , defined by recursion as follows:
xb = yb ⇤
a7 ! xb = yb
xg(xb ) ⇤
a7 ! xb 2 xg
8xbj(xb ) ⇤a7 ! 8xb 2 Rb [j(xb )]⇤a
lxb .j(xb ) ⇤
a7 ! {xb 2 Rb : [j(xb )]⇤a}
where [j(xb )]⇤a is the result of applying the map ⇤a to j(xb ). Of course, the vari-
ables ofL2 andL a2 are not typed. The function of the subscripted indices is to track
variables.
There is also a quite natural map in the opposite direction. Restrict attention to
formulas of L a2 whose variables are indexed with an ordinal b < a . If a quantifier
is bounded by Rb , then the variable it binds should be replaced with an appropriate
variable whose index is b . For example, 9x 2 Rb j(x) is to be re-written as 9yb 2
Rb j(yb ), where yb does not occur in 9x 2 Rbj(x).
Define xb ⌘ xg as 8zd (zd (xb ) $ xd (xg)) with d =max(b ,g)+1. Then predica-
tion, even when involving a mismatch of types, can then be reinterpreted as follows:
xg(xb ) 7 ! 9zd (xg ⌘ zd ^ zd (xb )),
where d =max(b ,g)+1.
For each ordinal a , define a map †a fromL a2 toL a+2, by recursion, as follows:
xb = xg
†a7 ! xb ⌘ xg
xb 2 xg †
a7 ! xg(xb )
8xb 2 Rb j(xb ) †
a7 ! 8xb [j(xb )]†a
{xb 2 Rb : j(xb )} †
a7 ! lxb . [j(xb )]†a
What interesting properties are preserved under these translations? Linnebo and
Rayo argue that truth is preserved:
5We indulge in some use-mention confusion here. At the outset of this paper, we use ‘Rb ’ for
the b th rank in the iterative hierarchy, starting with a set R0 of urelements. Here, ‘Rb ’ is a primitive
symbol in the language L a2 . As usual, we rely on context to disambiguate, although the presence or
absence of italics should help.
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Assume a type theorist and a set theorist confront a domain of individ-
uals. The type theorist is interested in the ideological hierarchy of con-
cepts based on these individuals. By contrast, the set theorist is interested
in the ontological hierarchy of sets based on these individuals regarded
as urelements. ... Assume that the individuals in question form a set. ...
Then ... the translations preserve truth value. For in both cases a limit
level consists of the ‘union’ of the values of variables of all proceeding
levels. And in both cases a successor level consists of the ‘union’ of the
values of variables of the proceeding level plus all ‘collections’ of val-
ues of variables of that level. This ensures that the concepts of type g
are isomorphic to the sets in Vg , for g an arbitrary ordinal. It follows that
⇤[a ]must map every truth ofL a to a true sentence ofL a2 , and that †[a ]
must map every truth of L a2 to a true sentence of L a+2. (Linnebo and
Rayo forthcoming, italics added)
Let a be an ordinal and let 0 < b < a . In the intended interpretation of L a , the
range of a variable xb is all b -order concepts of the individuals, construed exten-
sionally. Given the assumption that the individuals form a set, and that the types are
cumulative, the range of xb just is the b -rank Rb in the iterative conception of set (as
defined at the start of this paper), with the individuals as urelements.6
Notice that the map †a only provides a (truth-preserving) translation from bound-
ed set theory to liberalized type theory, where the bounds are the Rb ’s (with b < a).
One may desire a translation from the language of ordinary, unbounded set theory.
As Linnebo and Rayo point out, this can be accomplished if there is a reasonable
way to restrict the quantifiers of ordinary set theory. Let ?a be a map from L2 to
L a+12 which restricts the quantifiers to Ra . Notice the following:
(i) If l is a limit ordinal greater than w , then ?l maps every theorem of Zermelo
set theory to a truth ofL l+12 .
(ii) If k is a strong inaccessible cardinal, then ?k maps every theorem of ZFC to a
truth ofL k+12 .
(iii) The absolutist, at least, holds that there is such a thing as truth in the iterative
hierarchy (given a fixed set of urelements). By adopting a suitable reflection
principle, there is a cardinal x such that the corresponding rank Rx satisfies all
and only the true sentences of second-order ZFC (see Shapiro 1987 or Shapiro
1991, section 6.3). So ?x maps every truth of set theory (with the given urele-
ments) to a truth ofL x+12 .
6See note 5 above. To avoid begging a metaphysical question, perhaps we should say that the
intended range of xb just is tightly isomorphic to the b -rank Rb in the iterative conception of set.
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By composing ?a and †a+1, we obtain a map fromL2 to the type-theoretic language
L a+32 . By choosing an appropriate ordinal a , the map can preserve interesting fea-
tures of the language of set theory. In the case of (iii), involving a reflection principle,
truth is preserved. Does that map preserve any more than truth? In particular, does
it preserve the intended interpretation of the language of set theory? Not for the
absolutist. To quote Boolos once again:
that truth is preserved does not mean that anything whatsoever is. In
particular, the speakers may have been talking about all sets, and rein-
terpreting what they say in such a way that it is not about all sets is
changing the meaning of what is said if not the truth value; to report our
speakers as having spoken only about the members of some set would
be to misrepresent what they said. (Boolos 1998, p. 31)
The entire project of liberalizing type theory presupposes set theory in the back-
ground. Set theory just is the metatheory. When constructing the liberalized ideolog-
ical hierarchy, the ordinals were given, or presupposed, from the ‘outside’. Indeed,
we defined a ‘language’ corresponding to each ordinal. As noted, we maintain con-
sistency by adopting the Set-theoretic Principle of Union in place of Naı¨ve Union.
Notice that that principle yields what is, so to speak, a proper class of ‘languages’.
There is no set whose members are all of the languages in the liberalized hierarchy.
In the present dialectic, this much is not problematic, since all parties to the de-
bate embrace set theory, in one form or another. A theorist might be more interested
in alternate principles of Union which fall short of motivating the full liberalization
of type theory. Specifically, if one is concerned about the amount of idealization
implicit in thinking of the levels in the ideological hierarchy as languages—as tools
useful for communication between humans—one might want to limit the ideological
hierarchy to levels indexed by ordinals that are somehow accessible to us, say via
some system of ordinal notation (see, e.g., Feferman 1988). In what follows, we
put this concern aside and focus on the absolutist prepared to accept fully liberalized
type theory.
3 Is the ideological hierarchy open-ended?
The connection between set theory and fully liberalized type theory is tight and, as
Linnebo and Rayo point out, it does suggest some arguments against absolutism. The
idea is that we should accept that the set-theoretic hierarchy is indefinitely extensible
given that it is natural to hold that the hierarchy of liberalized type-theoretic lan-
guages is itself open-ended. In particular, the existence of tight translations between
the ontological language(s) of (bounded) set theory and the ideological languages
of type theory shows that the ‘process’ of expanding expressive resources by going
to higher and higher types can be reproduced within set theory. So, the argument
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concludes, if the process of expanding expressive resources is open-ended, then so
is the iterative hierarchy.
Is the ideological hierarchy of languages open-ended? No matter how one wants
to characterize the notion of open-endedness, the following seems clear to us: since
the levels in the ideological hierarchy are indexed by ordinals, the process of expand-
ing one’s expressive resources by moving to higher types is open-ended only to the
extent that one’s system of indices—the ordinals in this case—are open-ended. How
could a definite stock of indices give rise to an open-ended hierarchy of languages?
The absolutist does a modus tollens on the conditional at the end of the previous
paragraph. Since there is a definite plurality of ordinals, the ideological hierarchy is
not open-ended.
An observer, trying to adjudicate the matter in favour of relativism, might point
out that, for the absolutist, the ideological hierarchy need not be confined to ordinals.
It could be expanded beyond the ordinals. For example, new indices, and corre-
sponding new types, could be introduced, by appealing to super-ordinals: W,W+
1,W+ 2, ...,2W, ...,W2, ... . A non-austere absolutist might construe these as proper
classes. But this just pushes the problem up another level. The non-austere abso-
lutist is in essentially the same position with respect to the realms of proper classes
and super-ordinals as the austere absolutist is with respect to the original iterative
hierarchy. If type theory is expanded beyond the ordinals, the resulting hierarchy is
open-ended only to the extent that the totality of proper classes and super-ordinals
is open-ended. The non-austere absolutist about sets is, or at least should be, an
absolutist about proper classes and super-ordinals.7 Therefore, she does not regard
the ideological hierarchy as open-ended, even when extended beyond the ordinals.
Moreover, there would be a similar absolute expansion of the ontological hierarchy.
There are proper classes, proper super-classes, proper super-duper-classes, ... , what
we may call proper w-level classes, proper w+1-level classes, ... .
Perhaps the idea of moving the ideological hierarchy beyond the ordinals could
be made more palatable, even to the austere absolutist. Instead of resorting to proper
classes, new indices and corresponding new types could be introduced by appealing
to set-theoretic objects that even the austere absolutist accepts. In section 1 above,
we showed how to define a relation, on pairs of ordinals, that, in effect, characterizes
a well-ordering ‘longer’ than that of the ordinals:
(a1,b1)  (a2,b2) if and only if either a1 < a2 or both a1 = a2 and b1 < b2.
The ‘order-type’ of this is W2 (so to speak). So our absolutists might consider index-
ing the ideological hierarchy with pairs of ordinals, ordered in the way indicated.
7As remarked above, we suppose that someone could be a non-austere absolutist about sets, but a
relativist about proper classes and super-ordinals. We will not comment on the extent to which that
combination counts as a form of absolutism. It is certainly not in the spirit of absolutism.
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The main problem with this proposal is that this extended ideological hierarchy
is unmotivated. As we have seen, Linnebo and Rayo propose that the liberalized
type theory gets its justification from Semantic Optimism and the principle of Set-
theoretic Union, the thesis that for any set of languages, there is a language that
encompasses all of them. For any ordinal a , Set-theoretic Union does yield a lan-
guage indexed by the pair (0,a), but it does not deliver a language corresponding to
even the pair (1,0).
Linnebo and Rayo accept a similar conclusion:
ABSOLUTE GENERALITY—together with the Principle of Semantic Op-
timism and the [Set-Theoretic] Principle of Union—can be used to mo-
tivate ascent to languages of type a for a an arbitrary ordinal. This
entails that the type-theoretic hierarchy has at least as many levels as
there are ordinals. But it does not, by itself, deliver the conclusion that
the hierarchy is open-ended. (Linnebo and Rayo forthcoming)
Of course, it will not do to reinstate the original Naı¨ve Principle of Union. That way
lies madness (or at least contradiction). Linnebo and Rayo suggest that a strength-
ened Principle of Union (short of the Naı¨ve one) might do the trick:
Strengthened Principle of Union: Let C be any definite collection of
type-theoretic languages. Then there is a ‘union’ language LC which
encompasses every language inC.
The analogy with Cantor’s original second generating principle is now complete. Let
us repeat it:
if any definite succession of defined ... [numbers] is put forward of which
no greatest exists, a new number is created ... which is thought of as the
limit of those numbers; that is, it is defined as the next number greater
than all of them.
Both principles invoke an unanalyzed notion of ‘definite’. On the basis of the Strength-
ened Principle of Union, one might argue in favour of the open-endedness of the
type-theoretic hierarchy as follows. If the totality of all type-theoretic languages were
not open-ended, there would be a definite collection K of all such languages. The
Strengthened Principle of Union would then yield a ‘union’ language LK , a language
that somehow encompasses all languages. By an extension of the above negative
result for liberalized type theory, a generalized semantics for LK could not be devel-
oped in LK . Semantic Optimism would yield yet another language, contradicting that
conclusion that LK encompasses all languages.
However, if this argument is good, then an analogous (but somewhat simpler)
argument would go from Cantor’s second number principle to the conclusion that
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the ontological hierarchy of transfinite numbers is open-ended. Indeed, we have seen
this argument before (section 2). Suppose that there were a definite totality of all
transfinite numbers. Then the second principle would yield a number greater than all
of them.
So which collections are definite? If the Strengthened Principle of Union is to go
beyond the above liberalized type theory (where we have a language corresponding
to each ordinal), then it must be stronger than the Set-Theoretic Principle of Union.
So there must be definite collections of languages that are not set-sized. Of course,
the austere absolutist will not accept this. For her, set theory is ‘a theory about all,
“absolutely” all, the collections that there’ are, and ‘set’ is ‘synonymous with “col-
lection”.’ The situation of the non-austere absolutist is parallel to the one we outlined
just above. It may be consistent to maintain a non-austere absolutism about sets, and
to become a relativist about collections, or definite collections, but once again such
a view seems highly unmotivated, and is certainly not in the spirit of absolutism.
Whatever collections our non-austere absolutist is willing to countenance, he will be
absolutist about them. And, of course, he will also deny that there is a collection of
all collections. In sum, the non-austere absolutist will maintain that the collections
are definite without admitting that there is a collection of all of them. This may be
a predicament, but notice that it has little to do with the ideological hierarchy. The
issue concerning what collections there are is one of the traditional problems for this
kind of absolutism. Advocates of that view have already confronted it, or should have
confronted it, and presumably made their peace with it. And the resolution will carry
over, directly, to the ideological hierarchy via the Strengthened Principle of Union.
Our non-austere absolutist will insist that the languages yielded by the principle are
somehow definite, but that there is no collection of them.
Perhaps the issue of collections can be circumvented altogether if we reformulate
a principle of union in plural terms, avoiding even apparent talk of collections or
totalities (as Boolos preferred to do). That might even bring the austere absolutist
back on board.
Plural Principle of Union: For any definite plurality of type-theoretic
languages, there is a ‘union’ language that encompasses all of them.
As with Strengthened Union, we restrict ourselves to ‘definite’ pluralities in order
to avoid the collapse into Naı¨ve Union. And the question of definiteness arises once
again: which pluralities are definite? Consider an analogous principle for sets: for
any definite plurality of things, there is a set of all and only those things. The abso-
lutist, of either variety, holds that, say, the ordinals are definite. Indeed, this is just
what it is to be an absolutist. Yet there is no set of all ordinals. So the absolutist
simply rejects this plural principle of sets. And, presumably, the non-austere abso-
lutist also rejects an analogous plural principle of collections. So, we conclude, the
absolutist, of either stripe, would simply reject the Plural Principle of Union. Indeed,
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our absolutist would simply point out that, given the absolutism, the Plural Principle
of Union just collapses into the Naı¨ve Principle of Union.
A final point: recall that the tight connection between the ontological iterative
hierarchy and the liberalized type theory assumed that the individuals/urelements
form a set. In that case, the a th rank, Ra , just is (or is strongly equivalent to) the
range of the variables xa of type a . What happens if the individuals do not form a
set? For example, what if we start the ideological hierarchy with all ordinals, or all
iterative sets, as individuals? We need not decide whether the individuals in question
are somehow definite (e.g. are a definite plurality).
This is an important scenario, at least for the absolutist. It is one way to artic-
ulate the semantic argument from section 1 above. A generalized semantics for the
language L2 cannot be developed in L2, for the usual reasons. But it can be pro-
vided in a second-order language of set theory. Of course, a generalized semantics
for that language cannot be developed in that language. And so semantic reflection
might take us to a third-order language. If the motivation for climbing up the ide-
ological hierarchy is strictly semantic, however, we only need to embrace the finite
orders. There is no motivation for taking this procedure, if that is what it is, into the
transfinite.
An alternative to the expansion of ideology is to expand ontology. Instead of em-
bracing concepts, concepts of concepts, etc. of sets or ordinals, we embrace classes,
classes of classes, etc., again up through the finite orders. This, of course, is not
available to the austere absolutist, but it is somewhat natural for the non-austere ab-
solutist. Indeed, it seems to be essentially the same thing (or a closely isomorphic
thing) as the given ideological expansion, to finite levels. Or one might embrace
relativism, and hold that the iterative hierarchy is itself indefinitely extensible. What
look like proper classes at one level are just interpreted as sets at the next level. It
may be that this is the most compelling and least ad hoc picture to adopt. But, if
so, that will be because the relativist picture is the most compelling one to adopt on
the purely ontological front. The tight connection between set theory and liberalized
type theory does not put new pressure on the absolutist positions.8
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